Policy analysis has long been a main interest of Clive Granger's. Here, we present a framework for economic policy analysis that provides a novel integration of several fundamental concepts at the heart of Granger's contributions to time-series analysis. We work with a dynamic structural system analyzed by White and Lu (2010) with well de…ned causal meaning; under suitable conditional exogeneity restrictions, Granger causality coincides with this structural notion. The system contains target and control subsystems, with possibly integrated or cointegrated behavior. We ensure the invariance of the target subsystem to policy interventions using an explicitly causal partial equilibrium recursivity condition. Policy e¤ectiveness is ensured by another explicit causality condition. These properties only involve the data generating process; models play a subsidiary role. Our framework thus complements that of of Ericsson, Hendry, and Mizon (1998) (EHM) by providing conditions for policy analysis alternative to weak, strong, and super-exogeneity. This makes possible policy analysis for systems that may fail EHM's conditions. It also facilitates analysis of the cointegrating properties of systems subject to policymaker control. We discuss a variety of practical procedures useful for analyzing such systems and illustrate with an application to a simple model of the U.S. macroeconomy.
Introduction
Although just three of Clive Granger's many papers explicitly focus on aspects of policy analysis (Granger, 1973; Granger, 1988; and Granger and Deutsch, 1992) , a central and long-standing concern evident throughout his work is that econometric theory and practice should be informative and useful to policymakers. In this paper, we further this objective by providing a novel framework for economic policy analysis that blends together a number of concepts at the heart of Granger's contributions to time-series econometrics: causality, exogeneity, cointegration, and model speci…cation.
Our starting point is a dynamic structural system with potentially cointegrated variables analyzed by White and Lu (2010) (WL) within which causal meanings are well de…ned. This system contains target and control subsystems, with possibly integrated or cointegrated behavior. We ensure the invariance of the target subsystem to policy interventions, obviating the Lucas critique, using an explicitly causal partial equilibrium recursivity condition. Policy e¤ec-tiveness is ensured by another explicit causality requirement. Causal e¤ects are identi…ed by a conditional form of exogeneity. These e¤ects can be consistently estimated with a correctly speci…ed model.
Following WL, we show that, given conditional exogeneity, Granger causality is equivalent to structural causality. On the other hand, given structural non-causality, Granger causality is equivalent to failure of conditional exogeneity. In this sense, Granger causality is not a fundamental system property requisite for reliable policy analysis, but an important consequence of necessary underlying structural properties.
By relying only on correct model speci…cation and not weak exogeneity or its extensions (strong and superexogeneity), our framework complements the policy analytic framework of Ericsson, Hendry, and Mizon (1998) (EHM) . Although giving up weak exogeneity may lead to loss of estimator e¢ ciency, it also makes possible policy analysis for systems that may fail EHM's conditions (see Fisher, 1993 ). As we also show, our approach readily lends itself to analysis of the structural consequences of a variety of control rules that the policymaker may employ. Among other things, we …nd that proportional (P) control cannot modify the cointegrating properties of a target system, whereas proportional-integral (PI) control can. In fact, PI control can introduce, eliminate, or broadly modify the cointegrating properties of the uncontrolled target system. Whereas cointegration between target variables and policy instruments is possible but unusual with P control, PI control can easily induce causal cointegration between the target variables (Y t ) and the policy instruments ( Z t ).
The control mode also has interesting implications for estimation, inference, and speci…cation testing in controlled systems. P control or a certain mode of PI control yields Z t I(0); resulting in standard inference. Other modes of PI control yield Z t I(1); the theory of Phillips (1988, 1989 ) may be applied to these cases.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the data generating process (DGP) for the controlled system we study here, together with notions of structural causality and policy interventions natural in these systems. Our causal notions enable us to formulate causal restrictions, essential for reliable policy analysis, that obviate the Lucas critique and that ensure policy e¤ectiveness. Section 3 discusses a conditional form of exogeneity that serves to identify causal e¤ects of interest and that forges links between structural causality and Granger causality. Section 4 reviews properties of cointegrated systems relevant here, with particular attention to their structural and causal content.
In Section 5, we give an explicit comparison of our framework with that of EHM, summarizing their similarities and di¤erences and commenting on their relative merits. Section 6 analyzes the structural consequences of various rules that may be employed by policymakers to control potentially cointegrated systems. We pay particular attention there to how the policy rules may introduce, modify, or eliminate cointegration within the target system and to the possible cointegrating relations that may hold between policy instruments and target variables, or among the policy instruments. Section 7 discusses econometric considerations that arise in empirically analyzing potentially cointegrated controlled systems and o¤ers useful practical procedures and diagnostics. Section 8 illustrates these methods with an application to a simple model of the U.S. macroeconomy, and Section 9 contains a summary and concluding remarks.
In what follows, we often refer to processes "integrated of order d;" I(d) processes for short.
By this we mean a stochastic process that becomes I(0) when di¤erenced d times, where an I (0) process is one that obeys the functional central limit theorem.
2 The DGP, Structural Causality, Policy Interventions, and Recursivity
The DGP and Structural Causality
We begin by specifying the data generating process (DGP). For concreteness, clarity, and to a¤ord maximum comparability to EHM, we mainly work with a linear N variate structural vector autoregression (VAR) with two lags:
X t Y t Z t = 0 + A 1 X t 1 + A 2 X t 2 + " t ; t = 1; 2; :::;
where Y t represents observable "target" or "non-policy" variables 1 and Z t represents observable "policy instruments" or "control variables" that may be useful for controlling As econometricians, we do not know the A's, nor do we observe the random "shocks" " t = (" 0 1t ; " 0 2t ) 0 : Although 0 ; A 1 ; and A 2 may depend deterministically on t; we leave this implicit to avoid further complicating the notation. We allow 0 ; A 1 ; and A 2 to generate unit root or other nonstationary processes, with or without cointegration. It is convenient to think of fX t g being (at most) I(1) as EHM do, but this is not essential.
By specifying that this is a structural system, we mean that it causally relates variables on the right to variables on the left. For example, consider an intervention to X t 1 , denoted x t 1 ! x t 1 and de…ned as the pair (x t 1 ; x t 1 ): Then the direct e¤ ect on Y t of the intervention x t 1 ! x t 1 at (x t 1 ; x t 2 ; e t ) is de…ned as the di¤erence y t y t = ( 10 + A 11 x t 1 + A 12 x t 2 + e t ) ( 10 + A 11 x t 1 + A 12 x t 2 + e t ) = A 11 (x t 1 x t 1 ):
We see that A 11 fully determines the direct e¤ects on Y t of interventions to X t 1 : Indeed, its elements represent the direct e¤ects of a one unit intervention to any given element of X t 1 ; say x jt 1 ! x jt 1 + 1: Similarly, A 12 fully determines the direct e¤ects of interventions to X t 2 : We may therefore call A 11 and A 12 "matrices of e¤ects." These concepts accord well with intuition, and they are especially straightforward because of the linear structure. Similar notions hold generally. See White and Chalak (2009) and WL for discussion of settable systems, which provide causal foundations, relied on here, for the general case.
Using this notion of causality, we can say that if A 112 = 0; then Z t 1 does not structurally cause 2 Y t : Otherwise, Z t 1 structurally causes Y t : If A 112 = 0 and A 122 = 0 then Z t 1 t 2 (Z t 2 ; Z t 1 ) does not structurally cause Y t : Without structural causality from policy variables to target variables (i.e., without A 112 6 = 0 or A 122 6 = 0), policy cannot be e¤ective. EHM (p.375) make a parallel observation, but stated in terms of Granger causality. We provide further comments below, when we relate structural causality to Granger causality, using the framework of WL. Here, structural causality is the operating prerequisite.
Policy Interventions and Recursivity
For economic policy analysis, we need the concept of a policy intervention. The rough idea, consistent with EHM, is that this is a change in the structure determining Z t : To be su¢ ciently 2 This causality is direct causality, but we will leave this implicit.
clear about how this works here, we posit an underlying "partial equilibrium" structure, compatible with the system (1). Although this leads us through some seemingly familiar territory, there are some perhaps subtle, but nevertheless important twists along the way.
We write the partial equilibrium structure as Y t = b 1 + B 10 Z t + B 11 X t 1 + B 12 X t 2 + 1t Z t = b 2 + B 20 Y t + B 21 X t 1 + B 22 X t 2 + 2t ; t = 1; 2; ::: .
This resembles a familiar system of simultaneous equations, but, in line with conventions of settable systems founded on the prescriptions of Strotz and Wold (1960) , the right-hand side (RHS) and left-hand side (LHS) variables are distinct, as "responses"Ỹ t andZ t appear on the left, whereas "settings" Y t and Z t (and their lags) appear on the right.
This seemingly minor notational di¤erence re ‡ects an important feature of such structures: denoted B j ! B j (j = 1 or 2) as a pair (B j ; B j ) of structural coe¢ cients representing "old" (B j ) and "new" (B j ) regimes. We also call structural changes "structural shifts." A policy intervention, B 2 ! B 2 ; is a structural change in the policy equation, i.e., that determiningZ t :
Our nomenclature is broadly consistent with that of Hendry and Massman (2006) .
To specify the system's response when all LHS variables are determined jointly, rather than in isolation, we must specify how this joint determination is achieved. For this, we apply the fundamental requirement of mutual consistency, necessary for equilibrium. In equilibrium, the structure (2) satis…es
Although this resembles a classical system of structural equations, we explicitly do not view this as structural, because in the settable systems framework adopted here, structural rela-3 In settable systems language, partial equilibrium corresponds to the "agent partition," and full equilibrium corresponds to the "global partition." The partitions specify mutually exclusive subsystems, each of whose variables respond freely and jointly to variables outside that subsystem. See White and Chalak (2009) If instantaneous feedback is ruled out, one must explain how mutual consistency can nevertheless be achieved. A standard approach is that taken in game theory, where each player has su¢ cient information to compute the equilibrium. Let "player" 1 (the public) determineỸ t and "player" 2 (the policy authority) determineZ t : Using (3), the full equilibrium, X t ; is given by the reduced form structural VAR:
t = 1; 2; :::;
i.e., eq.
(1), where
; and
In this framework, it su¢ ces for each player to know B 1 ; B 2 ; and t ( 0 1t ; 0 2t ) 0 : We now have su¢ cient foundation to embark on policy analysis, that is, the study of the consequences of changes to the policymaker's subsystem of the DGP. A crucial requirement for traditional policy analysis is that the full equilibrium structural VAR for Y t is invariant to the policy intervention. Otherwise, even without an explicit rational expectations framework, the Lucas critique (Lucas, 1976) operates with full force, with the implication that policies ignoring strategic behavior by the public are doomed to fail. In the EHM framework, superexogeneity ensures this invariance. EHM (section 3) also give compelling evidence that this invariance does hold in practice.
Our use of settable systems permits ensuring the required invariance using an approach alternative to superexogeneity. First, observe that because the structural reduced form A's depend on all the underlying "deep parameters" B, a policy intervention B 2 ! B 2 generally leads to a structural shift ( 10 ; A 11 ; A 12 ) ! ( 10 ; A 11 ; A 12 ) in the full equilibrium structural VAR for Y t ; violating invariance. The desired invariance is impossible without some further restriction. Here, the restriction analogous to superexogeneity is that B 10 = 0: We call this partial equilibrium recursivity, or, more simply, just recursivity. With recursivity,
This condition is su¢ cient for invariance to policy interventions of the reduced form structural VAR for Y t , as B 10 = 0 implies 10 = b 1 ; A 11 = B 11 and A 12 = B 12 : Recursivity is also necessary for invariance to policy interventions of the reduced form VAR for Y t , in the sense formally given by the next result. Recursivity is informationally plausible, as it allows the public to be ignorant of the policymaker's response function and shock. Instead, the public only has to know its own optimal response coe¢ cients, B 1 : Although 1t may include components known only to the public, it may also contain an "implementation error" or "tremble" that the public has no control over or immediate knowledge of.
Recursivity is also behaviorally plausible. Indeed, experimental evidence in economics does not support the hypothesis that interacting agents arrive at fully rational Nash equilibria. Instead, the evidence supports a "level k" hierarchy of agents, who adopt strategies of varying sophistication (Stahl and Wilson, 1994 ; see also Crawford and Iriberri, 2007) . Recursivity is consistent with viewing the public as a level k player and the policy authority as a level k + 1 player. This ordering is supported by the fact that the public is not a single monolithic rational agent, but an aggregate of agents of varying objectives and sophistication. On the other hand, the policymaker is typically a well-de…ned government entity with more or less coherent objectives and with resources su¢ cient to know or learn player 1's coe¢ cients B 1 ; which it may use to determine its coe¢ cients B 2 :
Thus, there are both informational and behavioral factors supporting recursivity. In what follows, then, we take partial equilibrium recursivity to be a maintained assumption, analogous to superexogeneity in the EHM framework.
Conditional Exogeneity and Granger Causality
Our discussion so far speci…es structural causality as a property of the DGP. Particular causal properties of the DGP ensure necessary invariance and policy e¤ectiveness conditions for policy analysis. So far, models, as distinct from the DGP, have played no role. We view this as an advantage, as delaying the introduction of models until absolutely necessary not only accords with Occam's principle, but also yields a theory with broader potential applicability. We now discuss two further concepts, conditional exogeneity and Granger causality, that bear directly on policy analysis and that are also properties solely of the DGP.
Conditional Exogeneity
In the settable systems approach, exogeneity plays a crucial role in identifying causal e¤ects.
Here, identi…cation means the notion of "correspondence to the desired entity" as discussed by Hendry (1995) and Hendry, Lu, and Mizon (2009) , based on notions of Wright (1915) . The particular correspondence relevant here is that between aspects (e.g., functions of moments)
of the joint distribution of observable variables, e.g., f(Y t ; Z t )g; and the structural information embodied in 0 ; A 1 , and A 2 :
WL give results implying that structural coe¢ cients ( 0 ; A 1 ; A 2 ) can be identi…ed when data are generated as in (1), provided that (X t 1 ; X t 2 ) is independent of " t given covariates 4 W t , or, in Dawid's (1979) notation,
This is a time-series analog of the selection on observables condition (Barnow, Cain, and Goldberger, 1980 ). When (6) holds, we say that (X t 1 ; X t 2 ) is conditionally exogenous with respect to " t given W t ; or just conditionally exogenous. This is a conditional form of the strict exogeneity relation,
In this case, W t has zero dimension. For example, (7) holds for the structure in (1) when f" t g is independent and identically distributed (IID), as in EHM, and f" t g is independent of (X 0 ; X 1 ); a standard assumption in this context.
When strict exogeneity fails, conditional exogeneity can nevertheless hold, as WL discuss in detail; see also White (2006a) . Suitable choices for W t are proxies for " t ; including not only current and lagged values of variables that may also be driven by " t but also their leads (see White and Kennedy, 2009 ). W t should not be driven by lagged X t 's.
Observe that conditional exogeneity is distinct from weak, strong, or superexogeneity (Engle, Hendry, and Richard, 1983) , as these concepts are de…ned strictly with respect to a model. In contrast, conditional exogeneity is a property solely of the DGP.
To see how conditional exogeneity ensures identi…cation of structural coe¢ cients, we write
The third equality uses (6), as this implies E(" t j X t 1 ; X t 2 ; W t ) = E(" t j W t ): The …nal equality invokes a simplifying linearity assumption, E(" t j W t ) = c 0 + C 0 W t ; with c 0 = 0:
Linearity is by no means essential, but it keeps our notation and discussion simple. When c 0 di¤ers from zero, then the structural intercept (i.e., the non-trend component of 0 ) becomes unidenti…ed; this need not be a serious di¢ culty, however.
Thus, regressing X t on X t 1 ; X t 2 ; and W t will yield consistent estimates of 0 ; A 1 ; A 2 ;
and C 0 ; under suitable conditions. These conditions can even permit structural shifts. As the details are somewhat involved, we leave this aside for now. The regression model implicitly referenced here must be correctly speci…ed for the sequence of conditional expectations fE(X t j X t 1 ; X t 2 ; W t )g; in keeping with the discussion of White (1994, pp.141-147, especially p.144) .
Note that models have just appeared for the …rst time and that weak exogeneity plays no role.
The only model condition we explicitly require is correct speci…cation for the conditional mean sequence fE(X t j X t 1 ; X t 2 ; W t )g: This condition does not apply directly to the structural system (1). Nevertheless, knowledge of important features of the DGP (1) plays a key role in achieving correct speci…cation. This knowledge includes (i) which variables are economically meaningful choices for Y t and Z t ; and (ii) which variables W t , driven by unobservable drivers of Y t and Z t , may plausibly su¢ ce for (6), conditional exogeneity. Speci…cation issues of functional form, numbers of lags, cointegration (discussed later), and even structural shift locations, among others, may be resolved from the data.
It is especially noteworthy that some, but not all, of the regression coe¢ cients in (8) 
Now we only require a correctly speci…ed model for the sequence fE(Y t j X t 1 ; X t 2 ; W t )g; again, weak exogeneity is not required.
Granger Causality
WL give results implying that given (1) and conditional exogeneity, Granger causality is equivalent to structural causality. WL also give results implying that given (1) and in the absence of structural causality, Granger causality is equivalent to the failure of conditional exogeneity. We now make these claims precise and discuss their implications for policy analysis.
The relevant equivalence of structural and Granger causality is as follows:
Proposition 3.1 Suppose that f(W t ; X t ; " t )g is a stochastic process satisfying (1) and (9), and that (Z t 1 ; Z t 2 ) is not solely a function of (Y t 1 ; Y t 2 ; W t ): Then (Z t 1 ; Z t 2 ) does not structurally cause Y t (i.e., A 112 = 0 and A 122 = 0) if and only if
The …nite-order Granger non-causality condition
classical G non-causality. In the notation here, the classical condition is
where Z t 1 (Z t 1 ; Z t 2 ; :::) is the "t 1 history" of fZ t g and W t contains no leads. As WL explain in detail, …nite-order G non-causality is the extension of the classical condition most directly relevant for "Markov" structures such as (1), in the sense that this is the condition equivalent to structural non-causality, given conditional exogeneity. The classical condition corresponds to more general structures under di¤erent but related exogeneity conditions. As WL also explain, the covariates W t can contain both lags and leads relative to time t; without violating the causal direction of time. Thus, the presence of W t in the …nite-order de…nition does not con ‡ict with the spirit (or causal content) of the classical de…nition.
Without further conditions, neither G causality property is necessary nor su¢ cient for the other. As WL note, the …nite-order condition is that usually tested in the literature.
Thus, in the presence of the conditional exogeneity required to identify speci…c causal effects, statements about G causality (speci…cally, the applicable …nite-order G causality) are essentially statements about structural causality. Given conditional exogeneity, it may therefore be possible to determine whether the policy and target variables have genuine causal links (as required by Granger and Deutsch, 1992 ; see also EHM, p.375), by testing whether (Z t 1 ; Z t 2 ) (or some other suitable …nite history) …nite-order G causes Y t (with respect to (Y t 1 ; Y t 2 ; W t )).
We qualify this statement by saying that this determination "may" be possible to signal that certain control scenarios can interfere with use of G causality for this purpose (see Sargent, 1976; Buiter, 1984; Granger, 1988; and Ermini, 1992) By itself, however, Granger causality is not enough to ensure the presence of the genuine causal links required for policy e¤ectiveness. The reason is that when structural causality is absent, Granger causality can still appear, as a consequence of the failure of conditional exogeneity.
In fact, the two properties are equivalent in this case:
Proposition 3.2 Suppose that f(W t ; X t ; " t )g is a stochastic process satisfying (1) and that 
(ii) Suppose (X t 1 ; X t 2 ) does not structurally cause Y t (i.e., A 11 = 0 and A 12 = 0). Then (X t 1 ; X t 2 ) does not …nite-order G cause Y t with respect to W t if and only if
Thus, when EHM (p.375) state, "Without Granger causality from instruments to targets, policy is unlikely to be e¤ective," one must recognize that, in the present context, the accuracy of this statement rests on the strict exogeneity (X t 1 ; X t 2 ) ? " 1t ensured by their speci…cation of the DGP (that f" t g is IID in (1); see EHM, p.373). Otherwise, the presence of Granger causality has nothing necessarily to say about policy e¤ectiveness, because it has nothing necessarily to say about the structural causality required for policy e¤ectiveness. Instead, G causality may simply be signalling exogeneity failure.
System Estimation With and Without Cointegration
Consider a generic structural VAR (i.e., we permit but do not require X t = (Y 0 t ; Z 0 t ) 0 ):
+ " t ; t = 1; 2; :::;
and suppose that X t is I(0) and that there exist r < N cointegrating relations such that 0 X t is also I(0); where is an N r matrix with full column rank. We emphasize that here the cointegrating relations are dynamic properties of the data generating process. They are explicitly not causal, as also emphasized by EHM, p.378. When 0 X t is I(0); there also exists an N r matrix with full column rank such that
See, e.g., Johansen (1988) . Letting A 2 then gives the standard error-correction cointegrating representation
where X t X t X t 1 and t 1 0 X t 1 : This also has a structural interpretation, representing the causal relation holding between the response X t and any admissible settings of RHS variables t 1 ; X t 1 ; and " t : Thus, the matrices and embody the e¤ects on X t of interventions to t 1 (long-run equilibrium departures) and X t 1 ; respectively. On the other hand, does not embody causal e¤ects between elements of X t :
When cointegration is present, the relevant exogeneity conditions permit estimation along standard lines. Speci…cally, suppose (6) holds. It follows from Dawid (1979, lemma 4.2(i) ) that
Thus, for example, we have
As for the Engle-Granger estimator (Engle and Granger, 1987) , one can apply a two-stage procedure, estimating in a …rst stage by least squares (Stock, 1987) , forming an estimate^ t 1 of t 1 ; and then regressing X t on an intercept and^ t 1 ; X t 1 ; W t to obtain standard estimators of 0 ; ; ; and C 0 : An interesting feature of this regression is that conditional exogeneity justi…es the inclusion of covariates W t ; as above, which may include both lags and leads with respect to time t: To the best of our knowledge, this possibility has not previously been noted. As above, C 0 has no structural meaning, whereas the remaining coe¢ cients have the desired structural interpretation.
Similarly, one can apply methods of Johansen (1988 Johansen ( , 1995 , but also including covariates W t as regressors along with X t 1 and X t 1 .
When cointegration does not hold, quasi-maximum likelihood methods nevertheless apply to deliver useful estimators of coe¢ cients of interest. We saw above that
Further, observe that with t X t E(X t j X t 1 ; X t 2 ; W t ) = " t E(" t j W t ); the exogeneity
It is plausible that this conditional heteroskedasticity can be exploited to yield a relatively e¢ cient GLS-like estimator, based on a suitable speci…cation for E( t 0 t j W t ): Observe that conditional exogeneity simpli…es the modeling, as X t 1 and X t 2 do not contribute to the conditional variance. On the other hand, since W t is explicitly chosen to predict " t ; we should generally expect it to predict t 0 t as well, a¤ording the opportunity for possible e¢ ciency gains. For completeness, we record the normal quasi-maximum likelihood estimator (QMLE) as the solution to the problem
where (
Although this is the usual normal QMLE, its asymptotic properties will vary, depending on those of fX t g; which may contain trends, unit roots, and possible unsuspected cointegration.
Generally, the QMLE will be consistent, but its asymptotic distribution need not be normal.
Asymptotic theory su¢ ciently general to handle this QMLE for the strictly exogenous case (W t absent) can be found in Phillips (1988, 1989) , Ahn and Reinsel (1990) , Li, Ling, and Wong (2001), and Sin (2004) . Developing theory for the fully general conditionally exogenous case in the absence of cointegration is an interesting topic for future research.
A Comparison with EHM
The settable systems-based policy analysis framework laid out above contains a variety of elements in common with the framework set forth by EHM. Nevertheless, the relation and roles of these elements di¤er between the two approaches. There are also elements in each that are not shared by the other. In this section, we brie ‡y summarize the similarities and di¤erences of these systems and comment on their relative merits.
The goal of both our approach and EHM's is to specify conditions under which one can analyze the e¤ects of policy interventions through the use of an econometric model. Both approaches start by specifying the DGP. For clarity and concreteness, both we and EHM work with a linear N variate structural VAR with two lags, eq.(1). For expositional convenience, EHM restrict fX t g to be (at most) I(1): We emphasize that this is just for convenience; in the next section we see how an I(2) process for Z t can arise naturally.
As EHM note, a necessary condition for policy analysis is that the policy instruments and targets have genuine causal links (EHM, p.375, condition 1). In our framework, this requirement is literally enforced by a structural causality condition: the causal e¤ects B 112 and B 122 of policy instruments Z t 1 and Z t 2 on the partial equilibrium responseỸ t must not both be zero.
Otherwise, the policy instruments have no causal e¤ect on the target variable. In contrast, EHM (p.375) link this requirement to Granger causality: "Without Granger causality from instruments to targets, policy is unlikely to be e¤ective." The quali…cation "unlikely" properly re ‡ects the lack of perfect correspondence between structural causality and Granger causality. The two are not the same, and the present framework draws the needed distinction, based on work of WL, who show that G causality and structural causality are equivalent, provided a suitable conditional form of exogeneity holds. In this sense, G causality is a derivative requirement that may be useful for testing the structural causality of policy instruments, which is the fundamental requirement here.
Another necessary condition is that the policy intervention "does not alter the econometric model in a self-contradictory way," ensuring that the Lucas (1976) critique does not hold (EHM, p.375, condition 3). EHM enforce this requirement by imposing superexogeneity to ensure the necessary invariance (Engle, Hendry, and Richard, 1983 , de…nition 2.9). Superexogeneity combines the properties of weak exogeneity and invariance to a speci…ed set of parameter interventions. Thus, superexogeneity is unde…ned without weak exogeneity. Weak exogeneity, however, is a property of a correctly speci…ed model relative to a DGP that acts primarily to ensure estimator e¢ ciency (see White, 1994, pp. 141-147) . A signi…cant concern is that imposing weak exogeneity can rule out important structures directly relevant for policy analysis.
For example, Fisher (1993) shows that weak exogeneity is violated when dynamic stability is imposed in cointegrated structural VAR models.
As a simpli…ed version of Fisher's (1993) 
Central to the EHM approach is the reparametrization of (11) in terms of conditional ( Y t j Z t ) and marginal ( Z t ) distributions. Here this yields 
Without dynamic stability restrictions, the parameters of the conditional and marginal distributions, 1 = ( 0 ; 1 ; 2 ; 3 ; ) and 2 = ( 02 ; 21 ; 22 ; 22 ), de…ne a sequential cut between the conditional model (12) and the marginal model (13). The cross restrictions stemming from (14) impose no speci…c restrictions on the elements of either 1 or 2 . Hence, weak exogeneity holds.
However, if short-run dynamic stability is imposed in (12), then we require j 2 j < 1. This, together with (14), implies j 11 1 21 j < 1. Now 1 and 2 are no longer variation free, and weak exogeneity of Y t 1 no longer holds. EHM policy analysis is not possible in this system.
In contrast, our approach enforces the needed invariance by imposing the partial equilibrium recursivity restriction B 10 = 0; i.e., Z t does not structurally causeỸ t in partial equilibrium.
This ensures that the coe¢ cients of the full equilibrium reduced form data generating process for Y t are invariant to policy interventions. This is not a property of the model, so we are not imposing invariance on the econometric model, as in condition 3 of EHM. But our requirement does imply that an invariant model for Y t can be correctly speci…ed, since recursivity ensures that invariance holds for the DGP. We view the transparency and plausibility of the partial equilibrium recursivity condition B 10 = 0 as a further advantage.
As we do not require weak exogeneity, our approach applies to the structurally stable VAR above or to Fisher's (1993) more elaborate example with cointegration. Although e¢ ciency may not be achieved without weak exogeneity, in our view this sacri…ce is worth the gain of permitting the analysis of important policy-relevant DGPs. Even without full e¢ ciency, relative e¢ ciency gains are often possible. And if weak exogeneity does hold, then nothing is lost.
Although we do not require estimator e¢ ciency, adept policy analysis minimally requires consistent coe¢ cient estimation. This is required for policymakers seeking to implement e¤ective policy, as these policies typically depend on the coe¢ cients of the structural VAR for the target. This is also required for econometricians seeking to understand how the components of the controlled system behave, both individually and jointly. To ensure consistent estimation, the coe¢ cients of interest must be identi…ed in the sense previously described. Otherwise, no model can inform us about these. Given identi…cation, we then require a correctly speci…ed model for certain aspects of the distribution of observables (e.g., speci…c conditional expectations). To ensure identi…cation of the various e¤ects of interest in our framework, we rely on conditional exogeneity requirements. Thus, whereas EHM rely on weak exogeneity in a correctly speci…ed model to arrive at e¢ cient estimates of weakly exogenous parameters, we rely on conditional exogeneity to identify structural e¤ects (coe¢ cients) of interest and a correctly speci…ed model to consistently estimate these. In this way, our approach satis…es EHM's condition 2 for a policy analytic framework to be of value, namely that "the model represents the economy closely enough that its policy predictions reasonably match outcomes." EHM additionally require that "the policy experiment is feasible" (condition 4) and that "the policy instruments are manipulable" (condition 5). These conditions are also in force here, but with the di¤erence that because policy interventions (experiments) here are structural shifts to the policy subsystem of the DGP, the model is not directly involved, as it is for EHM.
(Note that with settable systems, a su¢ ciently ‡exible DGP can readily accommodate policy interventions; one need not posit a separate DGP for each policy intervention.) Feasibility here means that the contemplated intervention to the policy subsystem is itself compatible with the DGP. Manipulability means that the policy instruments can in fact be set by the policy authority to the value speci…ed by the policy rule. In the discussion of Section 6, where we study implications of various policy rules, we take feasibility and manipulability for granted throughout.
Thus, EHM work with the DGP-based properties of Granger causality and cointegration, together with the model properties of weak exogeneity and superexogeneity to pursue policy analysis. Here, we pursue policy analysis using the DGP-based properties of structural causality, conditional exogeneity, and cointegration, together with the model property of correct speci…-cation. There are two causal requirements: (i) causality of lagged policy instruments for the partial equilibrium target response and (ii) recursivity, i.e., non-causality of current policy in-struments for the partial equilibrium target response. Invariance is a consequence of recursivity;
Granger causality is an implication of structural causality and conditional exogeneity.
Some Structural Implications of Policy Control Rules
So far, we have taken as given the dynamics of the control subsystem determining Z t ; that is, the policymaker's behavior. But policymakers may follow speci…c rules to attain their policy objectives; these rules generally have implications for the integration and cointegration properties of the system and its components. We now demonstrate the utility of the present framework by examining the consequences of various policymaker behaviors, all directed toward achieving the goal of a desired long-run expected value for the target variable. Despite its simplicity, this case usefully illustrates a variety of interesting features of the controlled system. The analysis is facilitated by not having to account for a priori considerations of weak exogeneity.
We begin by recalling the recursive partial equilibrium structural system speci…ed earlier, 
We explicitly rule out instantaneous causation by requiring that 1t is realized prior to Y t ; and that Y t and 2t are realized prior to Z t : These realizations can be viewed as occurring within the period, that is, after t 1 and before t: We emphasize this requirement by referring to this as contemporaneous rather than instantaneous causation. These equations now represent the natural system evolution in a form making it particularly suitable for describing policymaker behavior and for studying the implications of this behavior.
We …rst consider a system of the particular form
For simplicity, we assume here that the shocks f 1t g are IID with mean zero. Also just for simplicity, we take 2t = 0; so the policymaker is able to precisely implement their policy. Thus, 1t is independent of (X t 1 ; X t 2 ) and estimation is standard (e.g., Ahn and Reinsel, 1990 ).
Where convenient, we take N 1 N 2 ; this helps ensure that there are enough policy variables to control all the targets. In the appendix we explicitly treat the case where N 2 < N 1 :
With no control ( Z t = 0), we observe the "open-loop" target dynamics,
When 1 = 0; we have an integrated open-loop system for Y t without cointegration. Otherwise, with 0 < r rk( 1 ) < N 1 ; the open-loop target system exhibits cointegration.
We suppose the policymaker seeks to attain E( Y t ) = o in the long run, as, for example, when the policymaker targets an in ‡ation rate or a GDP growth rate. The question of how to adjust Z t to achieve a desired long-run policy goal or even a series of desired target values f Y t g in dynamic systems is the subject of the theory of optimal control. There is a vast literature in this area; the classical theory developed in engineering and related …elds, was adopted early into economics (Simon, 1952) , and has transformed in ways relevant to speci…c challenges in economics. See Ermini (1992) and Pagan (1997) for a discussion of this evolution.
Despite its potential importance for policy analysis, the study of control of cointegrated systems has only received modest attention so far. Besides Ermini (1992) and EHM, works considering various aspects of this topic are those of Granger (1988) , Karunaratne (1996) , Johansen and Juselius (2001) 
where b 2 and B 20 are properly chosen. The famous Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993) is of this form.
In the engineering literature, this is known as proportional (P) control of Y t : More sophisticated control methods are also common, especially the class of proportional-integral-derivative (PID) methods, which can also be expressed as a constrained version of eq.(15). We …rst consider P control, as this keeps the analysis relatively simple and delivers useful insights; later in this section, we consider a form of proportional-integral (PI) control. In discussing our empirical example, we discuss a form of PID control. Throughout, our analysis is fairly elementary. We refer the interested reader to JJ or Monti (2003) for deeper analysis.
The P-controlled "closed-loop" target system, obtained by substitution in (16), is
As long as Z t 1 structurally causes Y t (B 12 6 = 0), In what follows, we pay particular attention to comparing target system properties with and without control, that is, to comparing the closed-and open-loop dynamics. We develop our analysis by starting with simple cases and considering progressively more complex possibilities.
P Control without Open-Loop Cointegration
With P control and in the absence of cointegration, the closed-loop target system is
Closed-loop target system stability is determined by the roots of the characteristic equation
where z is a complex number. The closed-loop target system is stable if these roots lie inside the unit circle. To attain E( Y t ) = o ; we require that Y t is I(0); so we assume that the For brevity in this section, we leave implicit the other conditions imposed above.
Further, with P control, Z t is an a¢ ne function of an I(0) process, so Z t is I(0) and Z t is generally I(1): When Z t is I(1); we can ask whether Z t can be cointegrated. For this, we seek non-zero such that 0 Z t is I(0): We have
This is I ( We thus view cointegration within the P control system as possible but unusual. To support this, we now examine the choice of (b 2 ; B 20 ) in more detail. As noted above, we choose (b 2 ; B 20 ) to achieve the policy objective, E(Y t ) = o : To …nd a solution to this policy problem, we assume dynamic equilibrium at o and take expectations on both sides of (17) (18), we see that with this long-run objective the policymaker has a fair degree of latitude, as both b 2 and B 20 are subject to policymaker choice. Eq. (18) gives the required value for b 2 given any choice for B 20 ; even a choice with de…cient rank or with B 20 = 0; the no feedback rule. In the latter case, however, we require b 2 6 = 0 for control to be present, in which case cointegration in the control system cannot hold.
We also note that the closer the roots of the characteristic equation are to the unit circle, the slower is convergence to dynamic equilibrium; the closer to zero, the quicker. As can be seen Another consequence of (18) So far, we have seen that with P control and in the absence of open-loop target system cointegration, there can be no cointegration within the closed-loop target system and that cointegration within the control system is possible but very special. As Y t and Z t are generally both I(1); it also makes sense to ask whether there is or can be cointegration between the closed-loop target and control systems.
For this, we seek = (
As Y t is I(0); it is easily veri…ed that cointegration holds (with 
We again suppose the policymaker seeks to attain E( Y t ) = o . Our discussion parallels that for the pure integrated case, but now we must take proper account of the cointegrating terms.
The closed-loop representation for the target system is now
From this, we see that To see how policy can achieve a long-run policy goal, take expectations on both sides of (20) at the steady state, which gives
so that in the steady state
This restriction de…nes the feasible long-run policy targets. We call these "cointegration feasible." Any policy goal not satisfying this condition is unattainable in this system. Essentially, the cointegrating relations remove r < N 1 degrees of freedom from the policymaker's discretion.
This may enable the policymaker to focus on controlling a linear combination of Y t using a smaller set of policy control variables. We discuss this case in the appendix.
To solve for 1 ; multiply both sides of (21) by where we use the fact that 1 and 1 have full column rank, ensuring that 0 1 1 is nonsingular. Substituting this into (21) gives
Collecting terms, we get
where
is the "long-run impact matrix" (see JJ, eq. (4)). Observe that J 1 (B 11 + B 12 B 20 ) plays the role of a "…rst order autocorrelation" in this system. This determines the speed of convergence to the policy steady state, provided the roots of the associated characteristic equation are inside the unit circle. With P control, the policymaker can in ‡uence this speed of convergence by choice of B 20 :
Generally, J 1 is singular, so when we express b 2 in terms of B 20 ; we obtain
Compare this to (18) As for the pure integrated case, we ask whether cointegration can hold between the target and control subsystems. Now we seek = (
The analysis is essentially identical to the pure integrated case, as both involve P control. We obtain
As in the previous case, we obtain cointegration if and only if 
In contrast to the pure integrated case, there may be no such solution o : Thus, this possibility is even more exceptional than the pure integrated case. Although P control can sometimes induce cointegration between target and control, this is a very special circumstance, depending on exact policymaker choices that may be incompatible with policymaker objectives.
PI Control
A potential drawback of P control is that it cannot achieve policies violating 0 1 o = 0: If the policymaker's desired o is not compatible with this restriction, it would be useful to alter 1 ; say to~ 1 ; for which~ 0 1 o = 0 does hold. This cannot be done with P control. Accordingly, consider a system with a cointegrated open-loop target as above, but with the control system augmented by the inclusion of a term depending on Y t :
where 1 is N 1 r: This control system has a form known as proportional-integral (PI) control in the engineering literature. The presence of Y t implements the "integral" aspect of the control.
We denote this particular implementation PI 1 :
The closed-loop target behavior for this system is given by
We see that this system is cointegrated, but now with cointegration parameters ( 1 ;~ 1 ); with 1 1 + 1 : PI 1 control permits the policymaker to modify the cointegration-feasible policies. By suitable choice of 1 ; the policymaker can reduce the cointegrating rank or even remove cointegration entirely from the closed-loop target system (set 1 = 1 ). We have Proposition 6.7 When the open-loop target system is cointegrated, PI 1 control can modify or remove the closed-loop target system cointegrating vector, 1 + 1 .
We also see that with PI 1 control, since Y t is I(1); Z t = b 2 + B 20 Y t + B 1 12 1 0 1 Y t is generally I(1); so Z t is I(2): There could be linear combinations of Z t that are I(1); but as the details are involved and the circumstances special, we do not pursue this. Although the target and control are generally of di¤erent orders, we can see immediately from the control equations that Z t B 1 12 1 0 1 Y t is I(0), so Z t and Y t are cointegrated. Interestingly, this cointegration is generated by the causal control relation between Z t and Y t ; rather than simply re ‡ecting aspects of system dynamics.
With PI 1 , the policymaker can attain o for which~ Nevertheless, a straightforward elaboration of PI 1 does permit these possibilities. Speci…cally, consider PI 2 control, where, with 1 an N 1 r matrix,
0 ]Y t t = 1; 2; :::
A little algebra shows that the closed-loop target system has the form
Here, the cointegration vector is~ 1 1 + 1 and the e¤ect of equilibrium departures is 1 1 + 1 : Not only does PI 2 control permit the policymaker to modify the cointegrationfeasible policies, it permits the policymaker to adjust the response to equilibrium departures or even introduce cointegration into the closed-loop target system, despite its absence in the open-loop target system. We have Proposition 6.8 When the open-loop target system is integrated or cointegrated, PI 2 control can modify the closed-loop target system cointegrating coe¢ cients ( 1 + 1 ); ( 1 + 1 ).
As for PI 1 control, Z t is generally I(2): We do not pursue an analysis of the possible cointegrating properties of Z t as these can arise only under very special circumstances. Also, as for PI 1 , we see immediately from the control equations that Z t B where nowJ 1 I ~ 1 (~ 0 1~ 1 ) 1~ 0 1 : Another case of PI control …xes 1 at zero, with 1 6 = 0: We call this PI 3 control. This is the special case of PI 2 where the policymaker only modi…es the speed of error correction. Its properties can be inferred from our discussion of PI 2 , so we do not discuss this further here.
Estimating and Testing Controlled Systems
We now consider some econometric issues that arise in estimating and testing controlled systems.
Our discussion here is mainly pragmatic, in the spirit Granger (2009) compellingly advocated.
Thus, we will not be concerned so much with regularity conditions or asymptotic properties, but rather with describing practical methods that can o¤er useful insight while preventing us from going too far astray with any particular line of investigation.
A Controlled System for Estimation and Testing
For concreteness, we consider a DGP accommodating PI control of the target …rst di¤erences, In what follows, it is often convenient to take N 2 N 1 ; but we do not always require this.
The appendix provides further discussion of the N 2 < N 1 case.
The associated closed-loop target system is has non-zero rankr < N 1 ; so that the closed-loop system is in fact cointegrated.
An important aspect of these structures is that they are subject to structural shifts. The target system (24) is subject to "exogenous" shifts, that is, shifts arising outside the controlled system. The policy system (25) is subject to policy interventions associated with policy regime changes, tuning exercises, or exogenous shifts in the target system. Endogenous shifts in the target system (24) represent a failure of invariance, in which case the Lucas critique operates.
For now, we assume recursivity, ruling out endogenous shifts. Below, we discuss testing this.
Because the closed-loop target system contains coe¢ cients from both the target and control structures, the coe¢ cients of (26) can shift for any of the reasons just given. It is also in principle possible for the policy authority to undertake policy interventions that precisely o¤set exogenous structural changes to (24), leaving (26) unchanged. Nevertheless, this requires a su¢ cient degree of knowledge and ‡exibility that exogenous structural shifts in (24) are likely in practice to be re ‡ected in structural shifts in (26).
It is of course possible that the target subsystem experiences no exogenous shifts. This is the simplest and most favorable case for estimation and inference, so we begin with this.
Correspondingly, we suppose for now that there are no policy regime changes or tuning exercises in the control system. It follows that the closed-loop target system coe¢ cients also do not shift.
We …rst focus on whether policy can be e¤ective; that is, we wish to know whether B 12 = 0 in (24), or, when relevant, whether B 12 has full row rank. For simplicity, we take f 0 1t ; 0 2t g to be IID, with (Y 1 ; Y 0 ; Z 0 ) independent of ( 0 11 ; 0 21 ): This ensures strict exogeneity and makes estimation relatively straightforward.
Although we maintain the assumption of structural stability, to avoid going astray at the outset, it is helpful to begin by estimating the closed-loop system (26) and examining its stability.
As (26) is a standard cointegrated system, one can apply standard methods, such as the EngleGranger (1987) estimator or the methods of Johansen (1995) . One can test for stability using the methods of Bai and Perron (1998) Examining (24) and (25) with a view to estimating (24) and noting that (26) ensures that Y t is I(1); we see that there are two main possibilities for Z t . The …rst is that Z t is I(0); the second is that Z t is I (1) 
On the other hand, regardless of open loop cointegration, we have Z t I(1) with either PI 1 or PI 2 control. Thus, a test of the null hypothesis that Z t is I(1) vs. the I(0) alternative is a test for PI 1 or PI 2 control vs. P or PI 3 control, assuming correct speci…cation of (24) and (25).
Di¤erent considerations arise in estimating (24), depending on whether Z t is I(1) or I(0):
We take these up below. In either case, however, one must check whether Z t 1 is perfectly collinear with Y t 1 ; Y t 1 : The possibility of this collinearity underlies claims that Granger causality testing (here, structural causality testing) is useless for policy analysis (Sargent, 1976; Buiter, 1984) . As Granger (1988) pointed out, however, as long as there is any noise in the policy rule, this objection falls. We saw in Section 6 that noiseless control is e¤ective for achieving policy goals; here we see that this can hinder policy analysis by making it impossible to identify B 12 : Thus, noisy control is helpful for learning about B 12 ; and, in this regard, the noisier the better, as near multi-collinearity is almost as much a prohibitive obstacle as is perfect collinearity.
To assess potential di¢ culties in identifying B 12 ; that is, to see how great a problem collinearity may be, one should investigate the relation between Z t and (Y t ; Y t ) before estimating (24).
An immediate simple diagnostic is the R 2 from the regression of Z t on a constant, Y t and Y t ;
i.e., (25). We would ideally like to …nd a good but not perfect …t. Too loose a …t suggests that the policy instrument is not actually being used to manipulate the supposed target or that some control rule other than P or PI is in use. A good …t suggests at least that the policymaker believes B 12 is not zero. We return to this regression below, but for now we suppose that we are in the typical situation in which the …t is reasonably good but not perfect.
The Z t I(0) Case
Suppose now that Z t is I(0): Then we can estimate (24) by standard methods for cointegrated systems. In fact, Z t I(0) implies~ 1 = 1 ; so we can estimate (24) If we do not impose the constraint that~ 1 = 1 in estimating (24), we expect that the estimates obtained from (24) and (26) will be similar. A speci…cation test can be performed by formally testing the hypothesis~ 1 = 1 : If we reject, this indicates that either or both (24) or (26) are misspeci…ed. This test can be conveniently performed by estimating a version of (24) modi…ed by including~ t 1 as well as Y t 1 ; using the Johansen procedure to estimate and test the cointegrating rank. Under the null hypothesis, the cointegrating rank will be zero, as cointegration is already captured by~ t 1 : If the Johansen procedure rejects the null of no cointegration, one must reject~ 1 = 1 :
The estimates of 1 and~ 1 may or may not di¤er, depending on whether the system is subject to P or PI 3 control By testing the hypothesis~ 1 = 1 ; we can test the null that P control is in e¤ect, against the alternative of PI 3 control. An easier test of the P control null can be accomplished using (25). With either P or PI 3 control, this relation can be estimated by regressing Z t on a constant, Y t ; and~ t : Under P control, the coe¢ cients on~ t are zero; under PI 3 control they are not. Thus, one can test P control vs. PI 3 control by applying standard tests for zero values of these coe¢ cients.
Usually, we expect that the estimates of b 1 and c 1 will di¤er and that the estimates of B 11
and C 11 will di¤er. When N 1 = N 2 ; we can use estimates of b 1 ; B 11 ; B 12 ; c 1 ; and C 11 to estimate b 2 and B 20 ; as
Generally, however, it is simplest to estimate b 2 and B 20 using a modi…ed version of (25), (25) has full row rank, it follows that
We can identify and consistently estimate c 1 C 11 c 1 C 11 from (26) and B from (25) (if B is unknown), permitting us to identify and consistently estimate b 1 B 11 B 12 : Conducting inference is then straightforward, although computationally somewhat involved.
The methods just discussed su¢ ce to identify and estimate all structural coe¢ cients for the P or PI 3 cases, so we now turn our attention to the case in which Z t I(1):
7.3 The Z t I(1) Case
The Z t I(1) case arises with PI 1 or PI 2 control. From (25), we see that the I(1) variable Y t appears on the RHS multiplied by D 2 ; which, in the case of PI 1 or PI 2 control, does not give an
Inspecting the target system
we see that the LHS Y t is I(0) (as ensured by (26)), but that two I (1) Phillips (1988, 1989) . The resulting inference for B 12 may be non-standard, however. An apparently simpler possibility is to use a modi…ed version of (26) to estimate B 12 , namely
where we replace 2;t 1 with an estimate from (25) with cointegration between them, as in Stock (1987) . In fact, one can identify and consistently estimate b 2 and B 20 from (25) with a variety of standard procedures, plausibly with standard p T asymptotics.
So far, the methods described for the Z t I(1) case cover identi…cation and consistent estimation of all system parameters except 1 and 1 when D 1 = 1 0 1 : But the singular value decomposition applies to represent D 1 as
where U and V are N 1 N 1 orthogonal matrices, is an N 1 N 1 diagonal matrix with r = Because the details appear somewhat involved, we leave a formal analysis of inference for B 12 based on the results of Phillips (1988, 1989) to future research.
Model Diagnostics
Regardless of whether Z t is I(0) or I(1); there is a variety of model diagnostics that both the policymaker and the econometrician should examine. For the I(0) case, these can be used to conduct formal speci…cation tests, as inference is standard; accordingly we omit the details.
In the discussion to follow, any references to tests apply to just the I(0) case. Nevertheless, these diagnostics can be also be computed for the I(1) case and may be informative. They also plausibly can form the basis for formal speci…cation tests, but this will require proper development of the relevant asymptotic distributions.
A particularly important diagnostic task is to examine the exogeneity of (Y t 1 ; Y t 1 ; Z t 1 ).
If this fails, the estimator of B 12 is not informative about the e¤ect of Z t 1 on Y t : Here, exogeneity is ensured by the assumption that f 0 1t ; 0 2t g is an independent sequence. A simple diagnostic for this can be based on estimates of 1t 1t + B 12 2;t 1 from (26), say^ 1t : One can form the analog of Durbin's (1970) h test from the regression of^ 1t on^ 1;t 1 : The estimated matrix^ of …rst-order autocorrelations can then be used to check or test whether the true autocorrelations are zero. This test will not have power against all possible alternatives, so one should also test autocorrelation using estimates of 1t and 2t from (24) and (25).
It is important to examine whether linear models based on (24) are correctly speci…ed, that is, whether the DGP for Y t is indeed the assumed linear structure analyzed here. If not, the estimator of B 12 is not fully informative about the e¤ect of Z t 1 on Y t ; and the policy rules discussed here may not be adequate for the desired control. There is an extensive literature on testing for neglected nonlinearity in regression analysis, ranging from Ramsey's (1969) classic RESET procedure to modern neural network or random …eld tests. (See, for example, Lee, White and Granger, 1993; Hamilton, 2001; and Dahl and Gonzalez-Rivera, 2003 .) The methods of WL for testing linearity (CI test regression 1 and 2) are quite convenient. One can also test for encompassing (e.g., Hendry and Mizon, 1982) , the information matrix equality (White, 1982) and other indicia of misspeci…cation, as detailed, for example, in White (1990) . These methods can be straightforwardly applied to (24), (25), or (26). In our illustrative application in Section 8, we give details of a neural network-based method for testing neglected nonlinearity.
The policymaker and the econometrician must also check whether recursivity holds. If not, the needed invariance is absent, and traditional policy control is unworkable. For this, one can apply methods of Engle and Hendry (1993) , who describe testing invariance without imposing weak exogeneity. See also Hendry (1988) and Hendry and Santos (2009) . Hendry and Massman (2006) survey and extend the concept of co-breaking, directly relevant here. A particularly straightforward procedure for testing invariance, related to methods of Hendry and Mizon (1998) and Krolzig and Toro (2002) , can be implemented using data spanning at least one policy intervention (b 2 ; B 20 ) ! (b 2 ; B 20 ); where one is willing to maintain the assumption of target structure stability. The idea is to estimate a version of (24) augmented by including a vector of dummy variables, say d 0t ; whose ith element d 0it is zero prior to policy intervention i and is one thereafter. The dates of policy interventions can be speci…ed a priori on theoretical or institutional grounds or can be determined empirically from estimation of (25), using, for example, methods of Bai and Perron (1998) . This augmented structure has the form
Under the null of recursivity, 1 = 0; evidence of departures from zero is evidence against recursivity. When Z t is I(0), one can apply standard methods to test 1 = 0:
A drawback of this test is that unsuspected exogenous structural shifts in the target system could confound its results, leading to false rejections. A procedure not subject to this di¢ culty involves constructing a sequence of dummies f(d 1t ; d 2t )g such that d 1t = 1 if there is a structural shift in period t in the target system (24) and d 1t = 0 otherwise; and d 2t = 1 if there is a structural shift in in period t in the policy system (25) and d 2t = 0 otherwise. One then regresses (d 1t ; d 2t ) on its lags and tests whether d 1t is structurally caused by lags of d 2t : Under the null of recursivity, there can be no such causality; otherwise, causality will be present. The challenge for this test is that it may require a relatively long data history with many breaks in order to have power.
As we further discuss below, it is important to rule out neglected nonlinearity when testing for recursivity, as neglected nonlinearity can manifest as one or more structural shifts.
Policy Implementation and Operation
Once the policy authority has determined that its policy instruments are indeed e¤ective (recursivity holds and B 12 is non-zero or, better, of full rank) and has gained reliable knowledge of b 1 ; D 1 ; B 11 ; and B 12 ; it can determine whether its desired policy goal o is feasible for some set of policy parameters b 2 ; B 20 ; and D 2 : If there are multiple feasible implementations, the policymaker can select a preferred implementation and begin policy operations.
Once policy operations begin, a main activity for the policymaker, besides manipulating the policy instruments, is to monitor the target system to detect exogenous shifts that will require policy interventions to keep the system on track. This raises some important practical issues that have not been addressed here or, to our knowledge, elsewhere in the cointegration literature. The …rst of these is how the policymaker detects shifts. In our earlier discussion, we implicitly assumed the policymaker could detect these immediately. But this is unrealistic. More realistically, the policymaker could apply statistical techniques for real-time structural change monitoring in either (24) or (26). Standard monitoring methods (e.g., Chu, Stinchcombe, and White, 1996; Hornik, Leisch, Kleiber, and Zeileis, 2005) do not necessarily allow detecting changes in a cointegrated structure; this is an interesting topic for future research. The second is the even more di¢ cult question of how the policymaker learns the new structure, once a shift has been detected. In practice, this also will take some time; how much will depend on the nature of the shift. Meanwhile, the show must go on; policy must continue.
This suggests that a realistic framework for policy analysis is one with adaptive learning by the policy authority in a context that permits cointegration and exogenous structural breaks.
Such a framework could possibly be based on the recursive learning framework of Chen and White (1998) , although this would need modi…cation to accommodate recursive learning of cointegrated structures. Handling exogenous breaks could be accommodated by keeping the learning rate constant or bounded away from zero, rather than declining to zero with the sample size, as Chen and White (1998) require. The form of policy rules emerging from such a framework could well be of the form (25), but with all the policy parameters adjusting through time, based on convenient recursive estimation strategies. Another possibility is that the policymaker behaves according to a recursive Bayesian procedure, such as that proposed by Pesaran, Pettenuzzo, and Timmermann (2006) . As analyzing such frameworks is beyond the scope of the present analysis, we leave this for future research.
Questions for the Econometrician
Questions of interest to the econometrician but not the policymaker involve extracting information known only to the policymaker. For example, the econometrician should be interested in whether the system is in fact under PI or P control, or whether some other rule operates. We saw above that given correct speci…cation, the econometrician can draw inferences about P or PI control from the integration properties of Z t : We have also seen that the econometrician can identify and consistently estimate (~ 1 ;~ 1 ); (b 1 ; B 11 ; B 12 ; 1 ; 1 ); and (b 2 ; B 20 ; D 2 ):
The econometrician may also want to know o : For this, (26) may provide su¢ cient information, as o must satisfy
Provided that the (r + N 1 ) N 1 matrix C has full column rank, we can solve for o as
To determine whether P or PI control correctly describes policymaker behavior, the econometrician can use the modi…ed version of (25),
where, for estimation, we replace unknown LHS coe¢ cients with their (…rst-stage) estimates.
One can then conduct speci…cation tests on this regression. If misspeci…cation is found, this
indicates that the policy rule is not P or PI control of Y t by Z t or that the policy goal di¤ers from long run targeting of E( Y t ) = o ; or both. Conducting these speci…cation tests When Z t is I(0); adjusting for this is straightforward; the distribution of the estimator of~ 1 (= 1 ) will typically not play a role, due to its superconsistency.
Once one has estimated the system coe¢ cients, one can investigate system impulse responses by perturbing 2;t 1 in (27) and simulating. One can also investigate the e¤ects of policy interventions by studying the e¤ects of changes to the elements of (b 2 ; B 20 ; D 2 ):
8 Illustrative application
The e¤ectiveness of U.S. Federal Reserve policy has been the focus of many previous theoretical and empirical studies. See, e.g., Bernanke and Blinder (1992) , Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1996) , Leeper, Sims, and Zha (1996) , and Hamilton (2008) , as well as the references given there. Here, we apply the framework described above to illustrate how one could examine this issue. We emphasize that because our goal here is only to illustrate useful methods, we will not push this investigation as far as would be required to arrive at a model su¢ ciently well speci…ed to deliver de…nitive insights about Fed policy. Thus, we will pay attention to indicators of model shortcomings without necessarily resolving the issues identi…ed. As will become apparent, resolving the issues uncovered will in fact require an extensive modeling e¤ort well beyond what we can feasibly undertake here.
For our illustration, we examine the impact of Fed policy on macroeconomic variables Y t (in ‡ation, unemployment, output, and oil prices) through the Federal Funds rate, Z t : While the We begin by examining whether the closed loop target system (26) and it permits us to examine both the short-run and long-run components of the DGP.
The test statistic is computed recursively, starting from a baseline period and extending backward or forward in time by adding observations to the baseline. Here we apply the backward recursion. Let T 1 index the …rst observation in the baseline sample considered in the recursion.
We set T 1 to December 2002, ensuring …ve years of the data in the baseline period, T 1 ; :::; T:
The statistic for subsamples including observations t 1 ; :::; T; with t 1 = T 1 ; T 1 1; :::; 1 is
where p (= 4) is the number of equations in the system and r is the cointegrating rank, as estimated by the Johansen (1995) procedure. Here, we …nd r = 1 cointegrating relation. The estimated variance-covariance matrices for the sub-sample including observations t 1 ; :::; T and the full sample are b t 1 and b T ; respectively.
Under the null hypothesis of DGP stability, the 95% quantile for the test is 1.36. We display two versions of the test in Figure 1 . The …rst, labelled X(t), is based on the full model, whereas the second, R1(t); is based on the long-run concentrated model, where the short-term variables have been concentrated out. This latter version is based on the model obtained after the …rst stage of the Johansen (1995) procedure.
As the graph shows, we do not reject stability for the closed-loop system using the R1 form of the test. The statistic for the X version crosses the critical value in April, 1996, but by a small amount. In line with our illustrative intent, we take these results as largely consistent with stability for the closed-loop system and proceed with our analysis; but we keep in mind that there could be some short-term instability.
Next, we apply an augmented Dickey-Fuller test to Z t ; the Federal Funds rate variable. We do not reject the unit root null, whereas the same test run on the …rst di¤erences does reject and that we are in the world of either P control or PI 3 control.
We now investigate whether Z t is collinear with Y t and Y t . The R 2 of this regression is 0:151, so we conclude that collinearity of the policy instrument with Y t and Y t is not an issue.
On the other hand, this somewhat low R 2 suggests that the control equation may not be fully capturing the Fed's behavior. Below, we investigate this further. By running the Z t regression with~ t in place of Y t ; we can easily test P control vs. PI 3 control. The coe¢ cient on~ t is strongly signi…cant (p < :001), so we reject the P control hypothesis.
Following the process described in section 7.2, we next test policy e¤ectiveness by testing whether B 12 is signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. We proceed in two di¤erent ways. First, we estimate the open-loop target system (24) using the method of Johansen (1995) . (26). As is immediately apparent from the tables, the results from this second estimation strategy are substantially the same as before.
Next, we test e 1 = 1 . As described above, we can test this hypothesis by applying the Johansen (1995) procedure to reestimate the target system (24) with the RHS variables aug-
We test whether the cointegrating rank in this augmented regression is zero using Johansen's (1995) trace statistic test. We cannot reject the zero-rank hypothesis at the 10% level, so there is no evidence of misspeci…cation on this basis.
We also examine the estimated residual …rst-order autocorrelations of the closed-loop system (26) and the open-loop target system (24), as a diagnostic for exogeneity of (Y t 1 ; Y t 1 ; Z t 1 ).
Overall, these do not indicate any obvious problems. For the closed-loop system these coe¢ cients On the other hand, the estimated autocorrelation coe¢ cient for the control equation is :340; suggesting some form of misspeci…cation, dynamic or otherwise. To see whether a simple autocorrelation adjustment can resolve matters, we apply the Cochrane-Orcutt technique to (25). The result is an estimated autocorrelation coe¢ cient of :527 and very di¤erent coe¢ cient estimates. As there is no lagged dependent variable in the control equation, this outcome suggests that more than simple autocorrelation may be at work. Plausibly, there may be one or more omitted variables.
To keep the scope of our example manageable, we just examine the possibility that instead of PI 3 control, the policymaker is executing PI 3 -derivative (PI 3 D) control, in which case a previously omitted term 2 Y t appears in the control equations 5 , so that (25) is modi…ed to
When we estimate the PI 3 D control equation, we …nd that the R 2 increases from :151 to :298:
This marked increase is due mainly to 2 Y t terms associated with in ‡ation and unemployment;
at face value, these terms have a clear role to play. On the other hand, residual autocorrelation drops to :289: This is a move in the right direction, but clearly PI 3 D control is not the whole story. Applying Cochrane-Orcutt to (28), we …nd an estimated autocorrelation coe¢ cient of :380: Encouragingly, the signs and magnitudes of the estimated coe¢ cients in this equation, while di¤ering somewhat from the OLS estimates, do not change nearly as much as they did when considering only PI 3 control. In particular, we reject the PD control hypothesis in favor of PI 3 D.
In line with our illustrative intent, we proceed by assuming PI 3 D control with autocorrelated errors. We further investigate this equation below, however.
PI 3 D control also modi…es the closed-loop system (26) to include a 2 Y t term. We refer to this as the "closed-loop PID system." Note that our prior omission of the 2 Y t term could explain the apparent short-term instability earlier found by the Juselius test. Indeed, when we re-run the Juselius test on the closed-loop PID system, we …nd no evidence at all of instability; the maximum value for the X version of the test is only about 1:06: That for the R1 form is smaller. We also …nd a very similar value for the cointegrating vector.
Next, we perform tests to explore whether (24), (28), or the closed-loop PID system are linear or whether there may be neglected nonlinearity. These tests are essentially those described in WL, section 5. The idea is to augment the regressors in a given equation with neural network terms, as in White's (2006b) QuickNet procedure, and then test whether the coe¢ cients of the neural network terms are all zero. This class of tests has been found to have good power to detect neglected nonlinearity. More speci…cally:
for equation (24), we construct a Wald statistic for each equation h = IPI, in ‡ation, unemployment, oil price, to test the joint hypothesis 11h = 12h = ::: = 1kh = 0 in:
for equation (28), we construct a Wald statistic to test the joint hypothesis 21 = 22 = ::: = 2k = 0 in:
for the closed-loop PID system, we construct a Wald statistic for each equation h = IPI, in ‡ation, unemployment, oil price, to test the joint hypothesis 31h = 32h = ::: = 3kh = 0 in:
In these regressions, 1 and~ 1 are replaced by their estimates. Estimated lagged errorŝ " 2;t 1 are included in (30) to accommodate the autocorrelation of the control equation error terms.
The function G is an activation function from the class of generically comprehensively revealing (GCR) functions (see Stinchcombe and White, 1998) . We use a ridgelet function,
Other examples of GCR functions include logistic cdf, normal pdf, etc. We call terms involving G "hidden unit" terms, consistent with the arti…-cial neural network literature. The integer k indicates the number of included hidden units and controls the allowed degree of nonlinearity. We choose 's from a set of candidates, constructed as in Huang and White (2009) . The algorithm to select the 's follows the QuickNet procedure described in White (2006b) . Tables 3-5 show the Wald statistic p values for each equation and each k. BH denotes the Bonferroni-Hochberg adjusted p values (Hochberg 1988) . The right lower corner element is the BH p value for the panel as a whole.
The stark message from these tests is that the target and control system equations are all misspeci…ed, with the apparent exception of the unemployment target equation. Not surprisingly, then, the closed loop PID equations are also found to be misspeci…ed. Clearly, simple Even though the Juselius (2006) tests accord with structural stability for our system with PI 3 D control, it is possible that the nonlinearity tests are detecting shifts in the short-run structure against which the X form of the Juselius test does not have power. Similarly, if one were to test for and …nd structural shifts in the linear PI 3 D system using other methods, e.g., those
of Bai and Perron (1998) or HJS, one could well be detecting neglected nonlinearities. Thus, only after disentangling these possibilities does it make sense to conduct tests for recursivity or invariance, as discussed above.
To distinguish structural shifts from neglected nonlinearities, one promising approach is to estimate neural networks of the form speci…ed above using indicator saturation methods of We close this section with a brief examination of the impacts of Fed policy implied by taking the linear PI 3 D system estimated here at face value. Speci…cally, we conduct the experiment of positively perturbing 2;t 1 in the PID analog of the closed-loop system (27) by three standard deviations for a single period. We choose a relatively large intervention in an attempt to make the e¤ects visually apparent. This amounts to a policy intervention increasing the rate of change of the Fed Funds rate for a single period, somewhat more than doubling the intercept of the control equation for that period. Even though the e¤ect (B 12 ) of the Fed Funds rate is statistically signi…cant, Figure 2 shows that the impacts of even this large shock are barely visible, apart from some initial upward e¤ects on unemployment. Inspection of the di¤erences between the series with and without the intervention show that except for oil, each series experiences an initial upward impact, declining to an eventual small negative impact. For oil, the impact is initially negative, but becomes less so, converging to a small negative impact.
Summary and Conclusion
One of Clive Granger's long-standing and central concerns was that econometric theory and practice should have direct value to policymakers. Here, we present a framework for economic policy analysis that provides a novel integration of several fundamental concepts at the heart of Granger's contributions to time-series analysis. We work with a dynamic structural system analyzed by WL with well de…ned causal meaning. The system contains target and control subsystems, with possibly integrated or cointegrated behavior. We ensure the invariance of the target subsystem to policy interventions and thus obviate the Lucas critique using an explicitly causal partial equilibrium recursivity condition, plausible on informational, behavioral, and empirical grounds. Policy e¤ectiveness corresponds to another explicit causality condition. Identi…cation of system coe¢ cients holds given conditional exogeneity, an extension of strict exogeneity distinct from weak exogeneity or its extensions. As we discuss, given conditional exogeneity, Granger causality and structural causality are equivalent. Given structural non-causality, Granger causality and the failure of conditional exogeneity are equivalent. In this sense, Granger causality is not a fundamental system property requisite for reliable policy analysis, but an important consequence of necessary underlying structural properties.
By relying only on correct model speci…cation and not weak exogeneity, our framework complements the policy analytic framework of Ericsson, Hendry, and Mizon (1998) . As we show, our approach readily lends itself to analysis of the structural consequences of a variety of control rules that the policymaker may employ. Among other things, we …nd that proportional (P) control cannot modify the cointegrating properties of a target system, whereas proportionalintegral (PI) control can. In fact, PI control can introduce, eliminate, or broadly modify the cointegrating properties of the uncontrolled target system. Whereas cointegration between target variables and policy instruments is possible but unusual with P control, PI control can easily induce causal cointegration between the target (Y t ) and the policy instruments ( Z t ). These properties are preserved under PID control.
The control mode also has interesting implications for estimation, inference, and speci…cation testing in controlled systems. P, PI 3 , or PI 3 D control yield Z t I(0); which results in standard inference. Other modes of PI or PID control yield Z t I(1); the theory of Phillips (1988,1989) applies to these cases.
One of the hallmarks of Clive Granger's work is that it has vigorously stimulated research, often in an astonishing number of di¤erent productive directions. Putting a positive spin on the fact that the analysis here leaves a potentially embarrassing number of questions asked but not answered, we are hopeful that, like Clive's work, these unanswered questions will stimulate interest in pursuing and resolving them. In addition to suggesting the relevance of new theory for inference in partially nonstationary systems with covariates and conditional heteroskedasticity, the analysis here suggests, among other things, opportunities for developing speci…cation tests distinguishing structural shifts and neglected nonlinearities, for studying control of nonlinear systems with cointegration using a misspeci…ed model, for studying covariates in control, for developing methods useful for real-time monitoring of structural change in cointegrated systems, and for analyzing recursive methods of adaptive policy control, robustly able to operate in cointegrated systems subject to exogenous structural shifts. We hope, also, that the practical methods described and illustrated here will, as Clive would have desired, have direct value to policymakers.
Mathematical Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.1 Su¢ ciency of B 10 = 0 is immediate. Given (4), we haveÃ 1 + B 10Ã2 =B 1 :
ThenÃ 1 =B 1 for allB 1 implies thatÃ 1 =B 1 for allB 1 such thatB has full row rank.
For all suchB 1 ;Ã 1 + B 10Ã2 =B 1 implies B 10Ã2 = 0; or equivalently that B 10 2B = 0:
BecauseB has full row rank, it follows that B 10 2 = 0: The existence of ensures that 2 has full row rank. It follows that B 10 = 0:
Proof of Proposition 3.1: This is an immediate corollary to theorem 4.3 of WL, with the assignments Y 1;t , Y t ; Y 1;t 1 , (Y t 1 ; Y t 2 ); Y 2;t 1 , (Z t 1 ; Z t 2 ); X t , W t ; and U 1;t , " 1t : The assumption (9), i.e., (Z t 1 ; Z t 2 ) ? " 2t j (Y t 1 ; Y t 2 ; W t ); is Assumption C.2 of WL.
We also use the fact that for structures separable in " 1t ; such as (1) This system is cointegrated, provided 1 0 1 + B 12 D 2 has rank less than N 1 : This is possible but not guaranteed, as B 12 D 2 has at most rank N 2 < N 1 : The policymaker thus has some latitude to modify the cointegrating properties of the open-loop target system, but because N 2 < N 1 there is less freedom than in the N 2 N 1 case. We proceed under the assumption that the policymaker can choose D 2 to attain a cointegrated closed-loop system with cointegrating rankr. P control obtains as the special case where D 2 = 0:
The derivations of Section 6.2 apply directly to give~ 0 1 o = 0 and This approach represents the policymaker's willingness to trade o¤ di¤erent components of its target goals. For example, it might be willing to accept higher unemployment to attain lower in ‡ation or vice-versa, recognizing that the available policy instruments do not permit achieving both lower in ‡ation and lower unemployment.
To see how this goal could be achieved, it is helpful to consider the rows H i of H one at a time. First, note that whenever H i belongs toB 1 = span(~ 1 ) (the set of all linear combinations of~ 1 ; i.e.,~ 1 ; where isr 1); then the only feasible value for the corresponding h oi is zero. If H i o = 0 is indeed a goal for the policymaker, further control (beyond attaining~ 1 ) is unnecessary, as the system will always tend to this value. The policymaker can in ‡uence the speed of convergence to the goal by manipulating B 20 ; but here this is a secondary consideration.
Instead, the policymaker can focus attention on achieving policy goals represented by choices H i belonging toB ?
1 ; the subspace of R N 1 containing vectors with a component orthogonal tõ 1 : With N 2 instruments, the policymaker can specify N 2 N 1 r such choices. To be feasible, these must be consistent with (32), so H i and h oi must satisfy (e.g., Hadley, 1961) , which is straightforward to check. For simplicity, suppose that for a given B 20 there are N 2 linearly independent such i 's. Stacking the rows H i gives
where is an N 1 N 2 matrix whose elements are functions of K and H: Because the policymaker can also adjust B 20 (modifying K), there is typically su¢ cient ‡exibility to ensure that this holds.
If there is no such combination of and B 20 ; then the policy goal is not feasible for the given choice of D 2 (and the resulting value for~ 1 ). If the policymaker is willing to modify D 2 ; even this need not be an obstacle. Note thatJ 1 has rank N 1 r; but because N 2 N 1 r; the nonsingularity of 0J 1 B 12 is plausible.
